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1.  Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Background 
 
This submission has been prepared in response to the Parliamentary Travelsafe Committee’s 
Inquiry into Automatic Number Plate Recognition Technology. This submission will outline how 
automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) works, its history and application, as well as some 
key privacy and data management issues. After outlining evaluations that have been 
undertaken of ANPR and highlighting some limitations, the submission will examine the 
implications of the technology for road safety.   
 
The primary focus of this submission is on the potential of ANPR to both detect and deter a 
range of illegal road user behaviours including unlicensed driving, the driving of unregistered 
and uninsured vehicles, speeding, and the noncompliance of heavy vehicle drivers with driving 
hour regulations and novice drivers with provisional licence requirements.  To this end, the 
submission will review different options for deploying ANPR, the risks associated with these 
different approaches, and how the likely road safety benefits of the technology could be 
maximised. To assist in this process, a set of principles is presented that can be used to assess the 
potential road safety benefits of ANPR technology. 
 
 
1.2  Scope of the submission 
 
While it is acknowledged that ANPR can be used to detect and prevent a wide range of 
criminal behaviour, this submission will primarily be limited to the road safety applications of this 
technology. This focus is in keeping with the research interests and expertise of the authors.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to consider some of the broader implications of ANPR, particularly as 
it relates to privacy requirements and the likely public acceptance of its use, since this may 
impact on the overall benefits to road safety that can be gained from the technology. 
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2.  ANPR technology 
 
 
2.1  Description of technology 
 
As Constant (2003) mentions, ANPR technology is based upon the same idea as Optical 
Character Recognition (OCR) used in document scanning technology. A document scanner 
merely makes an image of a document which can be stored on a computer. This, however, 
does not allow manipulation of the document’s contents. It is the use of OCR software that 
allows the scanned document to be converted into a document that can be altered using a 
word processing programme. Essentially, ANPR is the software that makes it possible to convert 
an image of a number plate (into a string of letters and number) which can then be used to 
search a database in order to determine whether the number plate appears within that 
database. Information such as who owns the vehicle, whether the vehicle is registered, insured, 
stolen, or is registered to an unlicensed driver can be stored within the database. Naturally a 
plethora of information about the vehicle’s owner can be included in the database. 
 
The ANPR software is one part of an interconnected system.  A camera is required to capture 
the image and, as Constant (2003) states, to ensure the maximum utilisation of the ANPR 
technology, an infrared camera should be used, so that number plate images can be 
captured in low light, and at night time. The image is then either stored at the camera’s site for 
later retrieval, or automatically sent to the ANPR system for conversion and then to the 
database for information retrieval. Any number plates that match the predetermined criteria 
(e.g. the vehicle is uninsured, or the owner is unlicensed) are then flagged for attention. 
 
Constant (2003) stresses the importance of both investing in good quality technology and in 
taking the time and effort to ensure that the entire system is configured for optimal image 
capture. These factors include, but are not limited to, assessing the level of illumination, the 
camera angle, and the shutter speed. Constant (2003) claims that he has experienced 
instances where number plate recognition rates have leapt from 30%-40% to nearly 100% when 
the camera angle has been adjusted. This factor must be taken into consideration, particularly 
if the use of existing enforcement cameras is contemplated. 
 
It should also be noted that there are some strong similarities and differences between ANPR 
technology and conventional speed cameras. Among the similarities, both technologies rely on 
the recognition of number plates to identify vehicles of interest. Furthermore, both technologies 
involve capturing images of vehicles that are potentially involved in illegal activity, without 
specifically identifying the driver of the vehicle. As such, the default position regarding the 
offender is that they are the owner of the vehicle, as recorded in the relevant database. 
However, there are also some important differences between the two technologies. In the case 
of speed cameras, the images are only collected and stored for those vehicles which exceed a 
predetermined speed threshold. However, ANPR technology involves the collection of images 
for all vehicles in the traffic stream, which are then used to cross-reference with other databases 
to identify vehicles of interest. As discussed below, this raises particular issues for privacy and 
data management and may influence the public acceptability of ANPR technology. 
 
Moreover, these similarities and differences between ANPR technology and speed cameras 
highlight the need for the technology to be assessed in the context of existing enforcement 
strategies, rather than in isolation. It is important to consider what benefits ANPR can offer, over 
and above current approaches or modification to current approaches, to ensure that the best 
mix of enforcement activities is being used to reduce illegal road user behaviours and related 
road trauma. 
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2.2  History and application 
 
ANPR is used most widely in Great Britain and was first used as a covert measure against 
terrorism (Shaw, Corden, Stallworthy & Dean 2004). It has since become used for policing and 
road safety purposes and is now so endemic that it has been claimed that every car 
movement throughout Great Britain is tracked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week through the use of 
ANPR, and its movement history stored in a database (Connor, 2005a). Initially this information 
was stored for two years (Shaw et al., 2004), but is now stored for five years (Evans-Pughe, 2006).  
 
ANPR was quickly adopted as a wider crime fighting tool by British Police Forces. In January 
1999 there were 15 Forces using ANPR, with another 8 Forces trialling the technology (Shaw et 
al., 2004). As of July 2002, all Forces throughout England and Wales were using ANPR as an 
essential tool in their armoury (Shaw et al., 2004). Part of the reason the system was able to be 
adopted so quickly was that the Police Forces were able to convert their already extensive 
network of closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) to be compatible with the ANPR 
technology. 
 
It was in 2002 that the police forces in Britain trialled the use of dedicated ANPR intercept teams 
(Home Office, 2004). Generally the intercept teams involved six police officers who either used 
a system which was able to make use of the existing fixed CCTVs in the area, or used a mobile 
ANPR unit (Home Office, 2002). These operations typically involve one team of Officers 
stationed at a point in the road and uses their ANPR unit to record the number plates of all 
passing vehicles. If a vehicle of interest is recognised by the system the intercept team stationed 
further down the road is able to pull them over. This process takes a matter of seconds (Home 
Office, 2002). 
 
After the six month trial in 2002 the intercept team concept was reviewed and found to have 
been extremely effective in terms of arrest rates (Home Office, 2004). It was only when it 
became clear that there was no funding to enable a wider roll-out of the ANPR intercept teams 
that another manner of funding the teams was suggested. The revenue gathered by the teams 
for apprehending drivers with, what the report calls ‘documentation offences’, and by fines 
issued by the teams for other offences, would be used to fund the ANPR intercept teams (Home 
Office, 2004). This required permission from Her Majesty’s Treasury, which was conditionally 
granted (Home Office, 2004).  
 
In addition to Britain, ANPR technology is increasingly being used in other countries, including 
France, New Zealand and Australia. Information provided by the Deputy Director of the 
organisation responsible for the roll-out of ANPR in France, Frédéric Greggio highlights that the 
ANPR technology is not without its problems (Personal Communication, 26 November, 2007). 
The French ANPR system utilises two different ‘engines’ to translate number plate images into 
numbers and characters that can be recognised in a searchable database. Before the 
database(s) can be searched however, a match must be achieved by the two engines. This, 
according to Greggio occurs only 30% of the time, leaving the other 70% to be identified by 
personnel. Some of the problems contributing to the low match rates are motorcycles being 
photographed from the front (as they only have a rear plate), dirty number plates, damaged 
number plates, foreign number plates, and vehicles passing one another at the time the image 
is captured (Personal Communication, 26 November, 2007). While the overall number of images 
that are being captured per day was not reported, 50 staff are currently required to adjudicate 
on the 70% of images that are not successfully matched by the two ANPR engines.  
 
To date, the application of ANPR in Australia and New Zealand has not progressed as far as in 
either Great Britain or France. While trials of this technology are underway in New Zealand, the 
Australian situation is more varied (Travelsafe, 2007). Tasmania, for example, has been using 
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ANPR since August 2004, while the ACT is only now looking at the issue (Travelsafe, 2007). The 
Federal Government is currently determining how to most effectively allow information sharing 
between the States in order to maximise the tracking abilities of ANPR (Travelsafe, 2007). 
 
 
2.3  Privacy and data management issues 
 
The issue of invasion of privacy was not directly addressed when ANPR was introduced as a 
counter terrorist measure, as it was exempt based upon the rationale that it was in the interests 
of National Security (Shaw et al., 2004). Privacy issues came to the fore when the technology 
experienced “function creep” (a term used by Wigan & Clarke, 2006) and started to be used as 
a law enforcement aid.  
 
Naturally there are issues regarding an individuals’ right to privacy which had to be addressed 
as ANPR databases contain, not only a large amount of personal information, but the vast 
majority of information pertains to people of no interest to the Police Force. This is a very large 
tool being used to monitor a very small percentage of the population, whilst containing a great 
deal of information about every person in the country. 
 
The British Police Force were able to avoid violating peoples rights by referring to Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights which states that privacy may legally be violated if it is 
deemed lawful and necessary to maintain the safety of people, or the nation (Shaw et al., 
2004). Therefore, the Police in Britain may use the ANPR database to investigate and/or track 
individuals, if-and-only-if, they suspect someone of unlawful behaviour (Shaw et al., 2004). In 
other words, they may not go data mining. That is, have a program that sifts through the data 
looking for patterns of information deemed to indicate suspicious activity. They must only track 
people who have been identified by the police, based on hard evidence, not patterns in the 
data. 
 
Nor, according to Shaw et al. (2004), is data about people to be held for an indefinite period 
based on the premise that it may provide useful information about another matter in the future. 
Hence, the ANPR database has to purge information that is more than two years old, unless the 
information pertains to a major crime (Shaw et al., 2004). This has now been extended to five 
years (Evans-Pughe, 2006). Another safeguard Shaw et al. (2004) refer to, is that the ANPR 
database can be freely searched for the first 90 days after the data is collected, thereafter a 
special application to a Superintendent must be made to access the information. If the data is 
between 2 and 5 years old the special application for information is made to a Chief Officer. 
 
It is worth noting that, while in theory, every Police Officer throughout Great Britain is able to 
search the ANPR database for the first 90 days that, according to John Dean, National ANPR 
Co-ordinator for the Association of Chief Police Officers (Ballard, 2006), in actuality it has been 
found that the computer system becomes very slow if too many people try to access 
information on the database. Therefore, in practice, queries are usually placed through 
specialised database operating staff. 
 
Some of the databases to which the ANPR system has access in Great Britain are the Police 
National Computer, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (which has records of all 
registered vehicles, and notes which owners have not paid vehicle excise duty), and car 
insurance databases (Home Office & Association of Chief Police Officers, 2004). Some 
insurance company databases are linked to the system, and some send in regular information 
updates. It should be noted that nobody, other than Police Officers, and the British Police 
Force’s administrative staff have access to the ANPR database.  
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2.4  Evaluations 
 
As explained earlier, in 2002 some British Police Forces trialled the use of ANPR intercept teams. 
Once permission was gained from Her Majesty’s Treasury to use the revenue from road safety 
infringement fines to fund a much larger trial the British Police Force was able to roll out ‘Laser 2’. 
This consisted of twenty three ANPR-enabled intercept teams from the British Police Forces, 
whose Officers were involved for a period of thirteen months. The number of person hours 
dedicated to the trial was 192 Full Time Equivalents.  
 
The ANPR intercept teams stopped a total of 180,543 vehicles. From these stops, the intercept 
officers: 
 
 arrested 13,499 persons, including: 
– 2,263 arrests for theft and burglary 
– 3,324 arrests for driving offences (for example driving whilst disqualified) 
– 1,107 arrests for drugs offences 
– 1,386 arrests for auto crime (theft from and of vehicles); 
 
 recovered or seized property, including: 
– 1,152 stolen vehicles (valued at over £7.5 million) 
– 266 offensive weapons and 13 firearms 
–  drugs worth over £380,000 from 740 vehicles 
– stolen goods worth over £640,000 from 430 vehicle; 
 
 issued fixed penalty notices, including: 
– 22,825 tickets for failing to display Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) 
– 6,299 for no insurance 
– 1,496 for no MOT 
– 20,290 for a variety of offences, including not wearing a seat belt, using a mobile 
telephone whilst driving (Home Office, 2004p. 6). 
 
One particular benefit of using ANPR intercept teams was that the Officers were found to spend 
77% of their time on-task (including travelling to and from intercept sites). This compared with 
57% of time on-task for regular Police Officers (Home Office, 2004). Additionally, a report on this 
trial at the nine month mark showed that the number of arrests made by ANPR intercept teams 
was ten times higher than figures for the national average arrest rate (Home Office, 2002). 
Another benefit of the ANPR system is that the intercept teams were able to make informed 
decisions about which vehicles to pull over, rather than relying on luck, following a ‘hunch’, or 
based upon stereotypes (e.g. a young person driving a powerful car might be pulled over just 
based on the fact that this is a ‘hoons’ type of car, rather then because it has no 
registration)(Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce, 2002; ACPO ANPR Steering Group, 2005). 
 
 
2.5  Limitations and potential risks 
 
The available evidence regarding the operation of ANPR in Britain and France highlights a 
number of limitations that can reduce the operational efficiency of the technology and its 
potential benefits for road safety. These are discussed below. 
2.5.1 Technical considerations 
 
Careful consideration must be given to purchasing good quality equipment (both hardware 
and software), and ensuring that it is set-up correctly. As noted previously these two factors 
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have a significant effect on the capture rate, and correct identification of the licence plate 
number (Constant, 2003). It is also important to investigate the accuracy of data in any 
database which is being considered for use as part of the ANPR system. The Home Office 
report, Driving Crime Down (2004), identified this as a significant weakness in the system, and 
highlighted that inaccuracies cause two problems. The first is the waste of police resources, and 
the second (which would also negatively affect the general public’s perception of the new 
technology) was that law-abiding citizens were being pulled over and unnecessarily 
inconvenienced. In addition, it may result in increased punishment avoidance by law breakers. 
(The concept of punishment avoidance is discussed in more detail in section 3.1.2. In brief, 
however, it relates to instances where offenders fail to be detected or are able to evade 
punishment, when they should otherwise have been apprehended and punished. There is a 
growing body of evidence suggesting that experiences of punishment avoidance can 
encourage further offending.) 
 
Another technical issue, as noted by Travelsafe (2007) in their call for this submission, is whether 
the ANPR software can be configured to capture off-centre and a-typical licence plates. While 
the number plates on the front of vehicles are highly likely to be placed in the centre of the 
bumper bar, the case is more variable with rear number plate placement. Vehicles such as four 
wheel drives that have a spare tyre mounted on the rear, and vehicles with towbars have off-
centre placement of their rear number plate.  
 
It is also possible that a trade-off may need to be made between the safeguards inherent in an 
ANPR system to protect against incorrect identifications and the overall costs of running the 
system. For example, as noted earlier, the French ANPR system utilises two engines, which 
presumably improves the accuracy of the automated identification process. However, an 
upshot of this is that over 70% of the images currently recorded are not successfully matched by 
the engines and thus require human adjudication (see section 2.2).  
2.5.2 Potential for punishment avoidance 
 
Besides the technical problems identified above, there are other potential constraints that may 
reduce the efficiency of ANPR operations in punishing those offenders who are initially identified 
by the technology. Firstly, according to the Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce’s (2002) analysis of 
an intercept team trial, of all the vehicles flagged by the ANPR system as being of interest to the 
police, only 2.8% of these vehicles were actually pulled over as there were not enough Officers 
available to query all flagged vehicles. In the thirteen month trial undertaken by 23 of the British 
Police Forces, the rate of pulling over flagged vehicles was less than 10% (Home Office, 2004). 
This is arguably analogous to a speed camera ‘recognising’ that 100 of the vehicles which 
passed it were exceeding the speed limit, but the camera only recording a picture of 3 to 9 (i.e. 
2.8% to less than 10%) of these vehicles.  
 
Secondly, the use of ANPR technology to identify offenders remotely, and to subsequently send 
them fines in the mail, relies on the accuracy of the address details in relevant databases. This is 
particularly problematic in the case of recidivist offenders who often lead dysfunctional lives 
and regularly change addresses (see Watson, 2004a for a discussion of this issue in relation to 
unlicensed drivers).  
 
Together, these potential inefficiencies may lead to relatively high levels of punishment 
avoidance among offenders, which could seriously undermine the deterrent value of ANPR 
technology (see section 3.1.2 for more discussion of this issue). 
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2.5.3 Ability to detect other offences 
 
While Home Office reports (e.g. 2004) mention that ANPR can be used to detect those who 
drive while using a handheld cell phone and those who fail to wear a seatbelt, capturing these 
people is incidental at best. The technology, at this stage, is unlikely to be able to be configured 
to automatically recognise these incidents. It is only through human intervention, either by ANPR 
intercept team members, or by somebody laboriously going through each image captured by 
the camera, that these offenders would be identified and caught. The image of the vehicle 
caught by the camera, however, would provide proof that is likely to reduce potential appeals 
and/or to assist with prosecutions. 
2.5.4 Fine recovery rates and potential for self-funding  
 
Overseas experience suggests that the introduction of ANPR is associated with a general 
upsurge in the number of traffic offences issued. However, based on the experiences in Great 
Britain, not all of these fines will be paid by offenders. Indeed, only 14% of fines issued using 
ANPR information in Britain, were subsequently paid (Home Office, 2004). As such, the possibility 
of using revenue from fines to fund the roll-out of ANPR technology and to cover the associated 
policing and administration costs, could be problematic.  
 
Moreover, the problems associated with fine recovery are likely to be exacerbated in cases 
where ANPR technology is used to target recidivist offenders. A range of studies have shown 
that recidivist offenders, particularly repeat drink drivers and unlicensed drivers, are more likely 
to engage in illegal and antisocial behaviours (Watson, 2004a). As such, these offenders may 
be less likely to pay fines and, thus, perceive ANPR operations as less threatening. This has a 
direct bearing on the issue of specific deterrence, which is discussed further in section 3.1.2. 
2.5.5 Factors impacting on public acceptance of ANPR technology 
 
As already noted in section 2.3, there are important privacy and data management issues that 
need to be considered to ensure that the public accepts ANPR technology and has 
confidence in its application. However, overseas experience suggests there are a number of 
technical problems that can also undermine public confidence in ANPR. Firstly, a means of 
avoiding detection that emerged in Great Britain is the use of number plate cloning (Mathieson, 
2007). As the term ‘cloning’ suggests, to avoid detection the number plate of a law-abiding 
person’s vehicle, that is similar to the criminal’s, is either illegally purchased or copied and 
attached to the criminal’s vehicle. Not only does cloning make it difficult to catch the offender, 
but it can inconvenience the innocent. If the offender breaks a traffic law (e.g. speeds, or 
enters a toll paying area and exits without paying) the innocent car owner will receive the fine. 
While it is not completely clear why number plate cloning appears to be more common in 
response to ANPR technology than speed cameras, it may in part be due to the stronger focus 
of ANPR in Britain on broader criminal activity. 
 
One theme that emerged in the British news articles relating to cloning was that the law-abiding 
citizens inadvertently fined in these cases often experienced difficulties in getting the police to 
take the matter seriously and/or having the fines cancelled (e.g. BBC, Inside Out, 2005). In 
addition, some were reported to have received court summonses as the matter was not 
rectified by police immediately, while others were pulled over by the Police who thought they 
were offenders (BBC, Inside Out, 2005). While it is acknowledged that this may be a small, and 
self-selected, sample of people who were willing (or angry enough) to tell their story to the 
press, these experiences nevertheless could affect public confidence in the system. 
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Another factor which may potentially undermine public acceptance of ANPR technology is 
‘function creep’.  For example, it appears that the historical development of ANPR technology 
in Britain was in part driven by self-funding imperatives. When ANPR was first introduced it was 
primarily involved the use of remote fixed-site cameras to identify and track known criminals. 
However, once the use of mobile intercept teams were trialled and found to be successful, a 
need was created to fund these more costly operations, which appears to have contributed to 
the decision to more specifically focus on traffic offences (Home Office, 2004). However it 
appears that function creep may account for the high levels of criminal detections that 
subsequently characterised the intercept operations.   
 
Another instance of function creep that may undermine public confidence in ANPR is the 
possibility of applying data mining techniques to the information collected by the technology. 
While some commentators in Britain (including Police) have warned against the practice of 
data mining on privacy grounds (Shaw et al., 2004), others have advocated its use as a general 
crime fighting tool. For example, Frank Whiteley (Chief Constable of Hertfordshire, Chair of the 
ACPO ANPR Steering Group) has promoted the value of data mining as a means of building a 
picture of a person’s (ie. offender’s) habits and lifestyle. The risk in this approach, however, is 
that profiles of non-offenders can also be derived from ANPR databases using data mining 
techniques.  
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3.  Road safety implications of ANPR 
 
In order to establish the likely road safety benefits of ANPR it is important to consider the role of 
traffic law enforcement and how its effectiveness may be enhanced by the use of the 
technology. Accordingly, the following section will briefly review the role of traffic law 
enforcement in road safety, drawing on the available evidence and relevant theory. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the particular ‘problem’ offenders that could be targeted by ANPR, 
including unlicensed, unregistered and uninsured drivers and fine defaulters. This section will 
conclude with a discussion of the best way to optimise the likely road safety benefits of ANPR. 
 
 
3.1  Role of traffic law enforcement in road safety 
 
Over recent decades, a growing body of literature has emerged indicating that traffic policing 
programs, particularly in conjunction with publicity campaigns, can prove very cost-effective in 
reducing road trauma.  Indeed, Australia has attracted international attention for the success of 
policing programs such as: 
 
 Random Breath Testing (RBT) (eg. Homel, 1988; Watson, Fraine & Mitchell, 1994; 
Henstridge, Homel & Mackay, 1997); 
 red light cameras (eg. Queensland Transport, 1995);  
 speed cameras (eg. Cameron, Cavallo & Gilbert, 1992; Delaney, Diamantopoulou & 
Cameron, 2003); and  
 randomly scheduled traffic policing (eg. Newstead, Cameron & Leggett, 2001). 
 
A key feature of successful traffic policing programs is their capacity to increase the 
population's perceived risk of being apprehended for breaking the road rules (Homel, 1986, 
1988; Zaal, 1994).  In this regard, South (1998, p.76) has argued that the: “reduction in the road 
toll . . . has arguably been the most successful example of public action to minimise a social 
problem in Australia, and there is solid evidence that general deterrence programs have 
played a major role.”  
 
Drawing on the work of Homel (1993), it has been argued that traffic law enforcement 
operations are most effective when they are: 
 
 unpredictable in their timing and location; 
 deployed in a widespread (ubiquitous) manner to ensure a broad coverage of the road 
network; and  
 difficult for drivers to avoid when encountered (Watson et al., 1994, 1996). 
 
Before examining how traffic law enforcement operations can most effectively achieve the 
above conditions, it is useful to review a number of key theoretical issues that assist in 
understanding the influence of these programs on driver behaviour. 
3.1.1 Deterrence theory 
 
Deterrence theory is a criminological perspective that has been used extensively in Australia 
and other countries to guide the development of many road safety countermeasures, 
particularly in the area of drink driving (eg. Ross, 1982; Homel, 1988). It has underpinned the 
design of traffic law enforcement programs such as RBT and speed cameras (Watson, 2004a). 
Deterrence theory focuses on explaining the conditions under which criminal acts are omitted 
or curtailed in response to the perceived risk and fear of legal punishment (Gibbs, 1975; Homel, 
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1986). The traditional or classical form of this theory asserts that the effectiveness of a legal 
threat is related to the perceived certainty, severity and swiftness of punishment (Homel, 1986; 
Vingilis, 1990). In other words, legal threats are most effective when people perceive that there 
is a strong likelihood of detection, arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment, when the 
eventual penalty is considered to be certain and severe, and when it is administered relatively 
quickly (Vingilis, 1990). 
 
An important distinction that is made in deterrence theory is between specific and general 
deterrence (Homel, 1986; Akers, 1994). Traditionally, specific deterrence has been 
conceptualised as the process by which an offender is deterred from reoffending through 
direct exposure to sanctions, while general deterrence concerns the deterring of the general 
community through the threat of sanctions (Homel, 1986). Consequently, through the process of 
general deterrence, it is proposed that legal sanctions have the capacity to influence 
community-wide behaviour. 
 
The available road safety evidence suggests that specific deterrence is best achieved by 
policies that increase the certainty and swiftness of punishment, rather than those based on 
increasing the severity of punishment (Nichols & Ross, 1990; Watson et al., 1996). For example, a 
study by Vingilis, Mann, Gavin, Adalf and Anglin (1990) comparing the specific deterrent effect 
of different drink driving penalties, found that licence suspensions were consistently related to 
road safety benefits. In contrast, more severe penalties in the form of higher fines (for first 
offenders) and more days in jail, and not being placed in a temporary absence program (for 
multiple offenders), were associated with more crashes and convictions. In the case of general 
deterrence, the policies that appear the most effective are those that increase the public’s 
perceived risk of detection, apprehension and punishment (Nichols & Ross, 1990; Watson et al., 
1996). For example, the success of RBT in Australia is generally attributed to its general deterrent 
effect, principally achieved through increasing the perceived risk of apprehension for drink 
driving (Homel, 1986; Watson et al., 1996). 
 
Homel (1988) has argued, however, that deterrence is  a dynamic, unstable process that is 
continually undermined by experiences such as lack of exposure to enforcement, successful 
episodes of law breaking, and peer pressure. In this regard, recent conceptualisations of 
deterrence theory have highlighted how experiences of punishment avoidance can influence 
behaviour more strongly than experiences of punishment in certain circumstances. For 
example, Stafford and Warr (1993, p.125) have argued: 
  
“. .  it is possible that punishment avoidance does more to encourage crime than 
punishment does to discourage it. Offenders whose experience is limited largely to 
avoiding punishment may come to believe that they are immune from punishment, even 
in the face of occasional evidence to the contrary”. 
 
Support for Stafford and Warr’s perspective has been obtained by Piquero and Paternoster 
(1998) in a study examining drink driving behaviour. They found that intentions to drink and drive 
were affected by both the experience of punishment, and punishment avoidance. More 
recently, a number of studies conducted in Queensland have confirmed that experiences of 
punishment avoidance are a significant predictor of the frequency of unlicensed driving 
(Watson, 2004a,b), speeding (Fleiter & Watson, 2006) and drug driving (Armstrong, Wills & 
Watson, 2005).  
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3.1.2 Hallmarks of successful traffic law enforcement operations 
 
Drawing on the available evidence and the deterrence concepts discussed above, the 
following section reviews the hallmarks of successful traffic law enforcement operations. 
3.1.2.1 General vs. specific deterrence policing practices 
 
The success of RBT confirms the value of a general deterrence-based approach to traffic 
policing.  This program involves the sustained use of highly visible, marked police vehicles to 
maximise drivers' exposure to the threat of apprehension (Homel, 1986; Fildes & Lee, 1993).  As 
such, it can be argued that RBT is essentially a communication tool, designed to influence 
community-wide behaviour (Watson et al., 1994). 
 
In contrast, there is little documented evidence that traditional apprehension-based policing 
programs (e.g. those using concealed or camouflaged police operations) are effective in 
encouraging widespread, sustained compliance with the law (Fildes & Lee, 1993).  Generally 
these programs can only achieve a specific, rather than a more widespread general, deterrent 
effect, due to their non-visible nature.  Therefore, the pool of drivers being influenced is 
relatively small (Watson et al., 1996). 
 
However, an evaluation of the Victorian speed camera program indicated that the crash 
reductions associated with the program were linked to both general and specific deterrent 
mechanisms (Cameron et al., 1992; Rogerson, Newstead & Cameron, 1994).  In particular, the 
results suggested that the receipt of a speed camera traffic infringement notice (a specific 
deterrent mechanism) was consistently associated with the observed crash reductions.  This 
result is not surprising given that the Victorian program featured a large number of cameras, 
generally operated in a non-visible way.  However, it remains to be seen whether it will be 
possible to sustain such a specific deterrent effect over time, particularly if the number of 
camera-related infringements were to decline (Watson et al., 1996). 
3.1.2.2 High levels of surveillance 
 
Zaal (1994) has argued that the primary means of heightening the driving public's perceived risk 
of apprehension is to increase the overall level of traffic surveillance.  This argument is consistent 
with the findings of both RBT and speed camera evaluations.  The RBT programs in NSW, 
Tasmania and Queensland have featured a level of activity equivalent to at least one licensed 
driver in three being breath tested each year (Homel, 1990; Watson et al., 1994).  Similarly, the 
introduction of speed cameras in Victoria resulted in a substantial increase in the number of 
speeding infringement notices issued, a factor which appears to have contributed to the 
success of the program (Rogerson et al., 1994). 
3.1.2.3 Resource deployment practices 
 
Evidence suggests that the randomised deployment of policing resources serves to establish 
and maintain the perception among drivers that a police vehicle could be located somewhere 
along a road at any time, whilst maintaining uncertainty about the exact location (Watson et 
al., 1996; Newstead et al., 2001).  In effect, drivers exposed to such enforcement will become 
vigilant and alert, even if they see no police vehicles, in the expectancy that the police could 
be `just around the corner' (Leggett, 1988).  Hence, the deployment of operations according to 
a random scheduling methodology offers a means of increasing the perceived unpredictability 
and ubiquity of traffic policing.  
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3.1.2.4 Minimising punishment avoidance 
 
As noted in section 3.1.1, the experiencing of punishment avoidance appears to undermine the 
deterrent effect of traffic law enforcement operations. Consequently, it is important that 
operations are conducted in an efficient and rigorous manner that minimises the possibility for 
offenders to evade detection.  
Furthermore, research by Homel (1986) has shown that convicted drink driving offenders are 
more fearful of RBT than those who have never been caught.  This illustrates the deterrent value 
of strategies which maximise the arrest rate, particularly among high risk offenders. More recent 
research, has suggested that the effectiveness of RBT in Queensland is linked to not only 
maintaining high levels of testing, but also to maximising the detection of drink drivers (Watson 
et al, 2005). 
 
To maximise arrest rates among drink drivers, it has been argued that highly visible stationary RBT 
operations need to be complemented by more targeted policing to detect persistent offenders 
and drivers attempting to evade detection (Homel, 1990; Watson et al, 2005).  However, highly 
visible operations should remain the primary method for RBT to ensure that the general 
deterrent effect is not undermined. 
3.1.3.5 The need to educate police about the role of deterrence 
 
Homel (1990) has highlighted the need for continuous feedback to police concerning the goals 
and effectiveness of RBT.  This is necessary to clearly establish the principles and validity of RBT 
as a general deterrence-based preventive policy and counter "the inevitable trend toward an 
apprehension-based policy" (Homel, 1986, p. 143). More recently, a Queensland study has 
suggested that some operational police do not fully appreciate the deterrence principles 
underpinning RBT, while many are not aware of the overall road safety benefits associated with 
the program (Watson et al, 2005; Watson, Freeman & Hart, in press). 
3.1.3.6 The reinforcing role of publicity 
 
Available evidence indicates that a key feature of many successful traffic policing programs 
has been the use of publicity to reinforce the public's perceived risk of apprehension (Zaal, 
1994; Elliott, 1993).  A strong feature of effective RBT programs in Australia has been the use of 
publicity to highlight the high risk of apprehension associated with the program (Homel, 1986, 
1988; Elliott, 1993).  As already noted, Cameron et al. (1992) found links between the levels of 
the TAC publicity supporting speed and alcohol enforcement programs and reductions in 
casualty crashes in Victoria.  Therefore, it appears that enforcement and publicity campaigns 
can achieve a synergistic effect, if they are complementary and well co-ordinated (Watson et 
al., 1996). 
 
 
3.2  Relevant ‘target’ behaviours for ANPR 
 
As noted in section 2.2, ANPR technology is increasingly being used in other jurisdictions to 
target illegal behaviours such as unlicensed driving, unregistered and uninsured driving and 
traffic fine defaulting. In addition, the Travelsafe Committee (2007) has identified the potential 
for ANPR to target speeding, fatigue offences among heavy vehicle drivers, and the non-
compliance of provisional drivers with relevant restrictions. The following section reviews the 
road safety implications of these behaviours and the potential role of ANPR technology in 
improving both the detection and deterrence of the behaviours. Special attention is given to 
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the issue of unlicensed driving, since this is a behaviour that has been extensively studied at 
CARRS-Q. 
3.2.1 Unlicensed drivers 
 
Unlicensed driving remains a serious problem in many countries, despite ongoing improvements 
in traffic law enforcement practices and technology (Sweedler & Stewart, in press; Watson, 
2004a). In the USA, over 10% of the drivers involved in fatal crashes do not hold a valid licence, 
while approximately 20% of all fatal crashes involve at least one of these drivers (Griffin & 
DeLaZerda, 2000). In Australia, unlicensed drivers represent over 5% of the drivers involved in 
fatal crashes, while crashes involving unlicensed drivers and riders account for almost 10% of the 
national road toll (FORS, 1997).  
 
Unlicensed driving represents a major problem for road safety in two respects. Firstly, it 
undermines the effectiveness of driver licensing systems by preventing the allocation of demerit 
points and reducing the impact of licence loss, which has otherwise been demonstrated to be 
a very effective deterrent to illegal behaviour (Watson 2004a, 2004b). Secondly, there is a 
growing body of evidence linking unlicensed driving to a cluster of high-risk behaviours 
including drink driving, speeding, failure to wear seat belts and motorcycle use (Harrison, 1997; 
Griffin & DeLaZerda, 2000; Watson, 1997, 2004a).  
 
Consistent with the above findings, Watson (2004c) utilised a quasi-induced exposure method 
to estimate that unlicensed drivers in Queensland were almost three times more likely to be 
involved in a reported crash than licensed drivers. In the event of a crash, those involving 
unlicensed drivers were twice as likely to result in a fatality or serious injury. A particular subgroup 
of concern is those drivers who are disqualified, not currently licensed or have never been 
licensed. A follow-up study in Queensland has demonstrated that these offenders represent a 
particularly deviant subgroup who report higher levels of prior criminal offending, alcohol misuse 
and self-reported drink driving (Watson, 2002, 2004a).  
 
A number of studies have indicated that a major contributing factor to unlicensed driving is the 
low perceived risk of apprehension associated with the offence (Nichols & Ross, 1990; Ross, 
1991; Watson et al., 1996). In addition, the Queensland studies have highlighted that many 
unlicensed drivers experience episodes of punishment avoidance (Watson, 2002, 2004a). For 
example, of 309 convicted unlicensed drivers interviewed after leaving the Brisbane Central 
Magistrates Court in the study, 97 (31.4% of the total sample) reported that they had been 
pulled over by RBT when driving while unlicensed, but didn’t have their licence checked. 
Indeed, of these offenders, 58 (18.8% of total) failed to have their licence checked at RBT on 
two or more occasions. In addition, a small number of offenders cited cases where they were 
pulled over for speeding or another offence and did not have their licence checked (8 and 11 
offenders, respectively). Finally, 11 offenders reported that they were able to evade a speed 
camera ticket for which they were responsible. (In these cases the offenders were driving either 
another person’s car or a work vehicle, and hence were able to avoid the allocation of the 
penalty.) In total, 113 offenders (representing 36.6% of the sample) were able to evade 
detection from the police on one or more occasions when they could otherwise have been 
identified. Of these offenders, 67 (21.7% of sample) evaded detection on two or more 
occasions. Most importantly, whether an offender evaded detection or not was found to be a 
significant predictor of their frequency of unlicensed driving. 
 
These findings largely reflect the difficulties that police have historically experienced in 
detecting unlicensed drivers. The first difficulty for the police is that, in practice, many drivers in 
Queensland are not required to carry their driver’s licence. For example, while the police have 
the power to randomly check licences in Queensland, only learner and provisional licence 
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holders are actually required to carry their licence. Open licence holders are given a grace 
period of 48 hours to present their licence to a police station (Travelsafe, 1998). As a result, the 
police are generally reluctant to systematically check licences. Within Australia, New South 
Wales is the only jurisdiction that currently requires all drivers to carry their licence, which 
facilitates the checking of licences at RBT operations in that state (Watson et al., 1996). 
Consequently, many researchers have called for the introduction of compulsory carriage of 
licence throughout Australia and the more widespread checking of driver’s licences (Job, Lee 
& Prabhakar, 1994; Watson et al., 1996; Staysafe, 1997; Watson, 1998, 2004a). Similarly, the 
Travelsafe Committee has recommended the introduction of compulsory carriage of licence 
for all licence holders on a number of occasions. 
 
The second difficulty faced by the police is confirming the validity of a licence, even when it is 
carried by a driver. For example, without some means of checking the available records, it can 
be difficult for the police to identify fraudulent licences or cases where the licence has been 
cancelled or suspended. Consequently, researchers have repeatedly noted the need to 
improve the roadside technology used by police to ensure the rapid identification of drivers 
who are unlicensed (eg. Smith, 1976; Job et al., 1994).   
 
Over recent years, the Queensland Police Service have equipped many of their vehicles with 
the ability to remotely access  Queensland Transport’s licensing and registration databases, 
which has overcome the inevitable time delays historically involved in making radio-based 
inquiries (Watson et al., 1996). While evaluations have indicated that this technology has 
assisted in improving detection rates, it still relies on the Police to visually identify vehicles of 
interest.  
 
As such, the potential exists to improve the detection of unlicensed drivers by utilising ANPR to 
identify those vehicles on the road that are either: 
 
 i) owned by driver who is unlicensed at the time (by linking to licensing and registration 
databases); or 
 
 ii)  is a ‘vehicle of interest’ that is suspected of being driven by an unlicensed driver (by 
linking to a database recording ‘vehicles of interest’). 
 
Based on these methods, it is likely that the use of ANPR would assist in identifying some 
unlicensed drivers who may not otherwise be detected. However, as noted in section 2.5, the 
successful detection of offenders using this approach is subject to a number of limitations, 
including the possibility that the potential offender is not the one driving the vehicle at the time, 
that Police may not have the necessary resources to pull-over all ‘flagged’ vehicles at the time, 
and that the address details for offenders may not be accurate if attempts are made to follow-
up the offender later. 
 
With regard to the first of the above limitations, the survey of unlicensed drivers recently 
conducted in Queensland provides some interesting information. Of the 309 unlicensed driving 
offenders interviewed in the study, a total of 290 provided ownership details for the vehicle they 
were driving at the time they were detected (Watson, 2004a). The majority of these offenders 
were driving a vehicle owned by themselves (62.5%), followed by a friend (21.4%), a family 
member (11.4%) or someone else (typically work vehicles) (4.6%). However, the proportion of 
offenders driving a vehicle that they owned (and thus presumably registered under their name) 
was not consistent across different types of offenders. In particular, the suspended drivers were 
more likely to be driving a vehicle that they owned (72.2%), whereas the least likely were those 
who had never been licensed (32.0%). This latter result is still surprising, since it indicates that 
almost one-third of the never licensed drivers actually owned a vehicle.   
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Over and above these considerations, the limitations discussed above do pose a particular 
threat to the road safety value of ANPR. Depending on how visible the ANPR operations are, 
there is a possibility that unlicensed drivers who fail to be subsequently apprehended after 
passing an operation will be aware that they have successfully evaded detection and, hence, 
may be more tempted to drive unlicensed in the future. These issues are further discussed below 
in section 3.3. 
3.2.2 The driving of unregistered vehicles 
 
As identified by the Travelsafe Committee (1999, 2007), the driving of unregistered vehicles 
poses a number of problems for road safety, including the possibility that such vehicles do not 
meet relevant safety standards, that it undermines the identification of vehicle owners as a 
means of managing driver behaviour (eg. through owner-onus legislation) that it reduces the 
revenue available to the government to maintain the road system, and that such vehicles are 
not covered by compulsory third party insurance. 
 
In addition, there is some evidence that the driving of unregistered vehicles is associated with a 
cluster of other high risk behaviours, which provides further justification for targeting these 
vehicles. For example, in the aforementioned survey of unlicensed drivers conducted in 
Queensland, 13% of the offenders reported that they were also convicted of driving an 
unregistered or uninsured vehicle at the same time they were convicted of unlicensed driving 
(Watson, 2003). 
 
The use of ANPR to detect unregistered vehicles overcomes some of the limitations associated 
with targeting unlicensed driving. In particular, no assumptions need necessarily be made 
about the licence status of the driver, since the driver will (knowingly or otherwise) be 
responsible for the offence. However, some of the other limitations regarding the capacity of 
police to either intercept offenders at the time or to follow them up using available address 
details still remain. Hence, depending on the efficiency of the operations, it is possible that some 
drivers will be able to avoid being punished for driving an unregistered vehicle, even if it is 
‘flagged’ by an ANPR operation. 
3.2.3 Speeding and driver fatigue 
 
Excessive speed has been identified as a long-standing and significant contributing factor to 
death and injury on the road in motorised nations worldwide (Fleiter & Watson, 2006).  The 
consequences of speeding, in terms of both crash incidence and severity, are well 
documented and include: increased crash risk due to reduced reaction time of the driver, 
increased risk of the severity of the crash, greater difficulty with vehicle control, increased 
stopping distance after application of brakes, greater impact forces in the event of a crash, 
and decreased reaction times for other road users (Fildes, Langford, Andrea, & Scully, 2005; 
Kloeden, Ponte, & McLean, 2001; Zaal, 1994).   
 
Despite the success of speed enforcement initiatives, particularly speed cameras (see section 
3.1.1), the prevalence of speeding remains high, and the behaviour remains pervasive, and 
arguably socially acceptable (Corbett, 2000; McKenna & Waylen, 2002; Pennay, 2005; Fleiter & 
Watson, 2006). Hence, there is a need to enhance existing speed enforcement 
countermeasures and develop new methods of both detecting and deterring speeding 
behaviour.   In this regard, there is value in determining whether the use of ANPR can effectively 
augment or replace the current speed enforcement tools being used in Queensland. However, 
as already noted, this assessment should not solely be based on the ability of the technology to 
detect some offenders who may not be detected otherwise. Firstly, it would be important to 
consider whether the devices would be as relatively efficient in detecting offenders as 
 15 
compared to alternative methods. For example, the failure of an on-road intercept team to 
pull-over all the vehicles in the traffic stream detected as speeding by ANPR would be 
analogous to a speeding driver passing a mobile radar operation and not being pulled over. 
Secondly, it would be important to consider whether ANPR operations could achieve the same 
level of general deterrence achieved by highly visible speed radar or camera operations. A 
final consideration is whether ANPR operations would be perceived as an acceptable speed-
reduction tool by the general community, compared to other methods of speed enforcement. 
Based on the experience of speed cameras, public perceptions in this regard would not only 
be influenced by the perceived accuracy of the devices but also the manner in which they are 
implemented (eg. overt vs. covert). 
 
As noted by Travelsafe (2007), ANPR technology is also being used in Queensland and some 
other jurisdictions to monitor heavy vehicle driving hours, as a means of reducing driver fatigue 
(Travelsafe, 2007). Consistent with the above argument, to establish the full potential value of 
ANPR as a countermeasure in this area, in would be necessary to compare its relative 
effectiveness in both detecting and deterring non-compliance with driving hour regulations with 
other relevant countermeasures. 
3.2.4 Provisional drivers and riders 
 
A final potential target group for ANPR operations identified by Travelsafe (2007) are those 
provisional drivers and motorcycle riders recently subjected to special restrictions relating to the 
number of peer passengers they can carry, the type of vehicle they can drive or whether they 
are able to drive late at night (a restriction currently applied to repeat offenders only, but one 
which could be extended to other novice drivers in the future). As noted by Travelsafe (2007), 
provisional drivers are over-represented in crashes and these new restrictions are based on 
research evidence from other jurisdictions. Consequently, it is important that these new 
restrictions are enforced as effectively as possible. 
 
However, a key issue that may reduce the potential value of ANPR in enforcing these restrictions 
is the proportion of the target group who may not be detected because they are not driving a 
vehicle they own (but rather one owned by a parent or friend). To off-set this problem, it may 
be possible to adapt the ANPR technology to identify P plates. However, this would still not 
overcome the potential problem of punishment avoidance among drivers who choose not to 
display their P plates.  
 
 
3.3  Optimising the effectiveness of ANPR 
 
The following section will review different options for deploying ANPR in Queensland, in order to 
identify the approach that would most likely optimise the road safety effectiveness of the 
technology (based on the available evidence). Drawing on the material presented in this 
submission, a number of principles will be used to guide this review including the capacity of 
ANPR operations to: 
 
 enhance the detection of ‘target’ illegal road user behaviours in a manner that is cost-
effective relative to current enforcement approaches; 
 
 enhance the specific deterrent effect of existing sanctions, by both improving detection 
rates and minimising opportunities for punishment avoidance among offenders 
compared with current approaches; 
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 enhance general deterrence by discouraging the general driving population from 
engaging in the ‘target’ illegal behaviours; 
 
 not divert resources from other more effective enforcement activities; and 
 
 maintain public confidence in traffic law enforcement and road safety efforts. 
3.3.1 Remote vs. intercept operations 
 
As noted in section 2.2, Great Britain was able to use its sizeable infrastructure of CCTV 
equipment to roll-out its remote ANPR system. Without such an existing infrastructure, it would be 
much more costly in Queensland to implement a large-scale remote ANPR system. In addition, 
while the ongoing maintenance costs for a remote system may be relatively low, the overall 
administration costs would be highly dependent on the accuracy of the technology and the 
degree of human involvement required for adjudication purposes. As shown by the French 
experience, considerable human resources may be required to maintain the integrity of the 
identification process (see section 2.2). 
 
A remote ANPR system also raises a number of potential privacy and integrity problems, which 
may limit the overall effectiveness of the system and undermine public confidence. Firstly, the 
operation of a remote system would require the use of an ANPR database to record the 
identified vehicles of interest. Given that this opens up the possibility of the database being 
searched for a variety of purposes, procedures would need to put in place to protect the 
privacy of the public. The nature and extent of these procedures would need to be consistent 
with current legislation and, presumably subject to considerable public consultation. Over and 
above these issues, procedures would need to put in place to deal with illegal behaviours such 
as number plate cloning (see section 2.5.4), which could otherwise undermine public 
confidence in the system.  
 
Finally, while a remote ANPR system may increase the detection rates of certain illegal 
behaviours that are currently difficult to identify (eg. unlicensed driving and the driving of 
unregistered vehicles), it is possible that such a system would still feature high levels of 
punishment avoidance. For example, some offenders could avoid detection and/or the 
receiving of fines by driving vehicles owned by other drivers, or by failing to renew their driver’s 
licence or vehicle registration address details. These strategies could not only undermine the 
specific deterrent effect of penalties but reduce public confidence in the system. 
 
In contrast, many of the above problems can be overcome or mitigated through the use of 
intercept-based ANPR operations. Firstly, many of the potential privacy problems are overcome 
since intercept operations only involve the ‘live’ checking of existing databases, without the 
need for recording details of all passing vehicles. Secondly, the experience of being pulled over 
by the police would generally represent a more salutary experience than receiving a fine in the 
mail, which may enhance the specific deterrent impact of the operations. Thirdly, some of the 
opportunities for punishment avoidance would be minimised since the police would be able to 
check the licence and address details of the drivers they pull over and issue the relevant fine on 
the spot. Finally, the process of intercepting potential offenders may provide an opportunity to 
identify other traffic offences, such as failure to wear a seat belt, which would not otherwise be 
possible. 
 
Nonetheless, intercept-based operations still feature a number of potential drawbacks. Firstly, 
opportunities still exist for punishment avoidance where offenders drive the vehicles of others or 
the police do not have sufficient resources to pull over all ‘flagged’ vehicles. As noted in section 
2.5.2, the documented trials conducted in Britain featured fairly low interception rates (relative 
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to the number of vehicles ‘flagged’ as being of interest). Secondly, intercept-based ANPR 
programs require an ongoing investment of police resources that may impact on other traffic 
law enforcement operations (see section 3.3.4 for further discussion of this issue). 
 
Therefore, on balance intercept-based ANPR operations would currently appear to represent a 
better option for enhancing road safety than remote systems, but sufficient resources would 
need to be allocated to the operations to ensure their efficient operation and to reduce the 
potential for punishment avoidance. This raises the potential for ANPR to detract from other 
successful policing strategies (such as RBT and speed cameras) if adequate resources are not 
provided to support the introduction of the technology. 
3.3.2 Overt vs. covert operations 
 
As noted in section 3.1.2, covert traffic law enforcement operations are generally characterised 
by high detection rates, which can serve to increase specific deterrence among offenders. 
However, the major drawback of such operations is that the public is generally unaware of the 
level of police activity and, thus, they contribute little to general deterrence.  
 
In contrast, the use of highly visible operations can not only serve to detect offenders, but can 
also act as a ‘communication tool’ to influence community-wide behaviour. As such, ANPR 
operations would be much more likely to influence community driver behaviour if they were 
highly visible. This is particularly relevant for behaviours such as unlicensed driving, for which the 
perceive risk of apprehension is currently quite low (see section 3.2.1). In other words, while 
highly visible operations may not detect as many unlicensed drivers at any one point in time as 
covert operations, they would be much more likely to deter someone driving unlicensed in the 
first place. Moreover, highly visible operations can still minimise the possibility of punishment 
avoidance if they are conducted in a rigorous manner (eg. by monitoring escape routes etc). 
 
A final benefit of highly visible operations is that they tend to be more acceptable to the driving 
public than covert operations. Inevitably, covert operations tend to be criticised on the grounds 
of revenue raising and entrapment. While highly visible operations are not immune from these 
criticisms, the strong public approval for RBT illustrates the public acceptance of such 
approaches (Watson et al., 2005). 
3.3.3 The use of random deployment methods 
A major challenge for general deterrence-based operations is to convince the driving public 
that enforcement can be encountered anywhere and at anytime on the road network. As 
noted in section 3.1.2.3, the available evidence suggests that random deployment 
methodologies offer an effective means of enhancing the perceived unpredictability and 
ubiquity of traffic policing. In addition, the use of random deployment methods could off-set 
potential criticisms that ANPR technology is being used to unfairly target certain places (such as 
lower socio-economic areas) or certain types of offenders. 
3.3.3 The use of supporting public education 
 
The available evidence suggests that public education, such as mass media advertising, can 
enhance the general deterrent effect of traffic law enforcement operations by heightening the 
public’s perceived risk of apprehension (see section 3.1.3.6). As noted by Elliott (1993), mass 
media education can also be used to explain the rationale for a new enforcement program to 
the public and to ‘signpost’ the need for drivers to change their behaviour. Accordingly, the 
effectiveness of a general deterrence oriented ANPR program would likely be enhanced by 
running a supporting public education campaign. 
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In addition, it would be important to educate operational police about the goals of an ANPR 
program, particularly of it was a general deterrence oriented program featuring the random 
deployment of operations. This would be necessary to ensure that operational police 
understood the deterrence principles underpinning the program and to reduce the ‘inevitable 
drift towards apprehension’ previously found with RBT operations (see section 3.1.3.5). 
3.3.4 Resourcing ANPR operations 
 
Previous research has suggested that general deterrence programs are most effective when 
implemented in a ‘boots and all’ fashion, characterised by high levels of police surveillance 
(Homel, 1990; Watson et al., 1994). This approach appears to contribute to a major shift in 
community perceptions regarding the likelihood of detection, which enhances the deterrent 
impact of the new program. This suggests that a general deterrence oriented ANPR program 
would be most effective if it was introduced (and publicised) in a high intensity manner. 
Alternatively, if the resources for implementing ANPR are limited in nature, it may still be feasible 
to promote a general deterrent effect through the managed use of high-intensity ANPR blitzes. 
 
However, it is critical from a road safety perspective, that resources are not diverted from other 
effective traffic law enforcement programs, such as RBT or speed cameras, to facilitate the 
introduction or maintenance of ANPR technology. In the short term, it is likely that a special 
allocation of funds would be required to introduce ANPR, particularly if implemented in a high 
intensity manner. In the medium term, it may be feasible to use the fine revenue generated by 
ANPR to run the program (similar to the Queensland Speed Camera Program). However, as 
noted in section 2.5.3, the fine revenue generated by the program may not be as great as 
expected (particularly if recidivist offenders are targeted) due to low fine recovery rates. 
Indeed, a recent report in the Courier Mail revealed that nearly half a billion dollars in fines 
remain unpaid in Queensland, $150 million of which are for speeding (Burke, 2008). In the 
longer-term it would be essential to undertake evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of ANPR 
operations, so that informed decisions could be made about the allocation of funds across 
different traffic law enforcement operations.  
3.3.5 Flow on effects to the policing of other criminal activities 
 
While this submission has primarily focussed on the potential road safety benefits of ANPR 
technology, it is recognised that decisions regarding its deployment will inevitably be influenced 
by broader policing imperatives and objectives. In this respect, it could be argued that the 
British experience suggests that remote (and possibly less visible) ANPR operations offer the 
greatest potential for preventing and deterring general criminal activity, due to the 
pervasiveness of the technology. While this may be true in the context of Britain where there is 
an extensive remote ANPR system in place, it remains to be seen whether such an approach is 
feasible or likely to be publicly supported in Australia.  
 
Moreover, while intercept-based operations may be less pervasive than remote operations, 
they still appear to be highly effective in detecting criminal activities, as demonstrated by the 
British trials (see section 2.4) and appear to represent fewer challenges for managing the 
privacy of drivers. As such, implementing an ANPR system in a manner that most benefits road 
safety may not necessarily undermine the broader applications of the technology to the 
management of general crime. 
  
 19 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
4.1  The current state of play with ANPR technology 
 
ANPR is a relatively new technology that appears to offer considerable potential to detect and, 
possibly, deter a wide range of illegal behaviours, including traffic offences. Like most new tools, 
however, the effectiveness of this technology appears to be determined by the way it is 
applied (not due to some inherent quality of the technology). In-keeping with this, this 
submission has explored the feasibility of applying ANPR to enhance road safety in Queensland 
and various strategies for optimising its potential benefits. 
 
Unfortunately, no rigorous evaluations of ANPR appear to have been undertaken around the 
world to date. Indeed, the majority of the information available in the public domain has been 
derived from a limited number of trials that have been conducted, primarily in Britain. Moreover, 
these trials have adopted a general policing perspective to ANPR, rather than a specific road 
safety perspective.  Accordingly, caution needs to be exercised when reviewing the available 
evidence and extrapolating the findings to other jurisdictions. 
 
Nonetheless, some tentative conclusions can be drawn from the available evidence. Firstly, the 
trials conducted to date do suggest that ANPR can enhance detection rates for a range of 
criminal and traffic offences, compared to traditional policing methods. Among the traffic 
offences that are typically detected in the British context are driving whilst disqualified and the 
driving of unregistered and uninsured vehicles. However, the efficiency of ANPR technology 
remains unclear. For example, in British trials it was only possible for intercept teams to pull over 
upwards of 10% of the vehicles that were ‘flagged’ by ANPR as being of interest. This has 
important implications for deterrence (as discussed below) and is analogous to a speed 
camera only being able to photograph 10% of the speeding vehicles passing by. Similarly, 
discussions with French experts have identified that their remote ANPR scheme fails to 
automatically identify upwards of 70% of the vehicles of interest, with substantial human 
resources required to adjudicate on these cases.  
 
Secondly, it is apparent that the use of ANPR technology raises a range of potential privacy 
problems, particularly when it is used in a remote mode. In these cases, the details of all vehicles 
passing an ANPR camera are recorded in a database for cross-referencing with other 
databases. This raises the potential for further interrogation of the ANPR database, including the 
use of data mining techniques. While the use of ANPR intercept teams overcomes some of 
these privacy problems, the likely acceptance of widespread ANPR operations in Australia 
remains unclear. More particularly, the widespread use of ANPR would require procedures to be 
put in place to protect the privacy of the public. The nature and extent of these procedures 
would need to be consistent with current legislation and, presumably subject to considerable 
public consultation. 
 
 Thirdly, a number of limitations and potential risks associated with ANPR technology have 
emerged, including: 
 
 the quality an nature of the equipment used can have a strong bearing on the 
efficiency of ANPR systems (see section 2.5.1); 
 
 for a variety of reasons many offenders passing ANPR operations can currently avoid 
being either detected or subsequently punished, which could seriously undermine the 
deterrent value of ANPR (see section 2.5.2); 
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 while it appears that the use of ANPR in Britain has enabled in the detection of a range 
of other traffic offences, including driving while using a handheld mobile phone and 
failure to wear a seatbelt, the this appears to occur in an incidental way and only when 
the technology is utilised by intercept teams (see section 2.5.3);  
 
 the fine revenue generated by ANPR operations in Britain has been lower than 
expected, with only 14% of the fines issued using the technology be subsequently paid in 
one of their trials, and may reflect the inherent difficulties involved in recovering fines 
from recidivist offenders (see section 2.5.4); and 
 
 a number of factors can undermine public confidence in ANPR technology, including 
the practice of number plate ‘cloning’ (where offenders attach illegal copies of other 
number plates to their cars), and the tendency for ‘function creep’ to occur where the 
technology is gradually applied to different aspects of policing (see section 2.5.2). 
 
4.2  Potential applications of ANPR in Queensland 
 
Over recent decades, a growing body of evidence has emerged confirming that traffic 
policing programs, particularly in conjunction with publicity campaigns, can prove very cost-
effective in reducing road trauma.  Indeed, Australia has attracted international attention for 
the success of policing programs such as RBT, speed cameras and randomly scheduled traffic 
policing.  A key feature of successful traffic policing programs appears to be their capacity to 
not only deter those offenders detected (ie. specific deterrence), but to deter the general 
driving population from breaking the road rules (ie. general deterrence) (see section 3.1).  
 
Despite the general success of existing traffic law enforcement programs, scope exists to utilise 
new technologies like ANPR to target particular types of offenders. Indeed, Travelsafe (2007) 
has recently identified a range of illegal road user behaviours that could be potentially 
targeted by ANPR including unlicensed driving, the driving of unregistered and uninsured 
vehicles, speeding, and the non-compliance of heavy vehicle drivers with driving hour 
regulations and novice drivers with provisional licence requirements.  A review of these 
behaviours suggests that: 
 
 considerable scope exists to apply ANPR technology to unlicensed driving, since a 
number of barriers currently exist to the effective detection of this behaviour (most 
notably the lack of compulsory carriage of licence requirements for open licence 
holders in the state), resulting in offenders experiencing relatively high rates of 
punishment avoidance (see section 3.2.1); 
 
 considerable scope also exists to apply ANPR technology to the detection of 
unregistered/uninsured driving, although the full road safety implications of this 
behaviour remain unclear (see section 3.2.2); 
 
 while the use of ANPR technology to target speeding drivers and heavy vehicle drivers 
who don’t comply with driving hours regulations is already occurring, the cost-
effectiveness of these operations need to be compared with more conventional 
methods of detecting these behaviours (see section 3.2.3); and 
 
 while the application of ANPR technology to detect provisional drivers who contravene 
licensing restrictions (such as peer passenger and late night driving restrictions) would 
appear problematic, given that many of these drivers will drive vehicles they do not 
own, this issue warrants further investigation (see section 3.2.4). 
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4.3  Recommendations for optimising the likely road safety benefits of ANPR 
 
Based on the literature reviewed in this submission, a number of guiding principles were 
identified that could be used to determine the best way to optimise the likely road safety 
benefits of ANPR.  It is proposed that policy developments in this area should be guided by the 
capacity of ANPR operations to: 
 
 enhance the detection of ‘target’ illegal road user behaviours in a manner that is cost-
effective relative to current enforcement approaches; 
 
 enhance the specific deterrent effect of existing sanctions, by both improving detection 
rates and minimising opportunities for punishment avoidance among offenders 
compared with current approaches; 
 
 enhance general deterrence by discouraging the general driving population from 
engaging in the ‘target’ illegal behaviours; 
 
 not divert resources from other more effective enforcement activities; and 
 
 maintain public confidence in traffic law enforcement and road safety efforts. 
 
Based on these guidelines, the following recommendations are made. 
 
Rec.1: Prior to any widespread implementation of ANPR technology in Queensland,  further 
investigation  is required into a ‘best practice’ approach for its implementation that 
would maximise its likely road safety benefits. This research should compare the efficacy 
of different approaches, both in terms of their impact on offenders and the general 
driving population. Priority matters to be considered in this research include: 
- which illegal behaviours can be most effectively targeted by ANPR operations; 
- the relative effectiveness of different deployment strategies including remote vs. 
intercept operations,  overt vs. covert operations, and different random scheduling 
methods; 
-  appropriate models for funding ANPR that will ensure that resources are not 
diverted from other effective traffic policing programs, such as RBT or speed 
cameras; 
- the most effective ways of harnessing public education to enhance the 
effectiveness of the technology; and 
- identifying issues that could potentially undermine public acceptance of the 
technology, including privacy and data management considerations and the need 
for procedures to deal with punishment avoidance strategies like number plate 
‘cloning’. 
 
Rec.2 Pending the finalisation of the above program of research, preliminary trialling of ANPR 
technology should focus on its capacity to act as a general deterrent to illegal driving, 
as well as a means of detecting offenders. This could involve the random deployment of 
highly visible intercept teams in discrete geographic areas, supported by locally 
targeted public education.   
 
Rec.3 Efforts should continue to enhance the effectiveness of existing enforcement programs 
targeting key illegal high-risk behaviours such as drink/drug driving, speeding and failure 
to wear seat belts. In the case of unlicensed driving, further consideration should be 
given to the introduction of compulsory carriage of licence for open licence holders in 
Queensland, to facilitate more routine licence checking.  
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